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POSTSCRIPT: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
B THEtimethis volume was ready to go to press, two to three years
had elapsed since completion of the basic analysis. The analysis rested
mainly on statistics covering the period through 1950, although most
series had been extended to 1952 or 1953. Naturally, the question
arises as to whether consideration of more recent developments would
modify the main findings of the study or the appraisal of long-term
prospects. The first half of the decade 1950-1960 is now a matter of
record. While ordinarily a few years would not be expected to have a
major impact on trends derived from the performance of an economic
sector during six decades, nevertheless the possibility of such an
impact cannot be dismissed. Trends are not immutable, and changes
during a short span of years may sometimes have strategic significance
for long-run analysis.
To answer the question just posed, this postscript, written from the
vantage point of early 1956, takes up the major topics of this mono-
graph in sequence and examines the effects of recent changes on the
main findings. No attempt is made, however, to bring up to date the
entire statistical framework of the study. The results of this re-examina-
tion are summarized at the conclusion of the chapter.
A Change in Growth Trend?
Have recent developments changed the long-term growth pattern of
capital formation in residential real estate—characterized by a declin-
ing rate of growth, or even arrested growth, if computed in real terms?
The answer varies with the analytic treatment of the data for the
period 1950 to 1955. In view of the substantial decline of residential
construction in the early years of the current decade, Chapter III con-
sidered the year 1950 to be the "tentative terminal peak" of a. cycle
beginning in 1925 or, alternatively, in 1941. This arrangement yielded
three long swings for the sixty years included in the study (or four if
the last cycle was divided into two), and the growth trends were
derived from cycle averages for each of the major swings. For a recon-
sideration of the position of the year 1950 in the last of these cycles,
the basic data are summarized in Table 76.
In terms of the number of dwelling units started, the year 1950
still represents a peak, but about the same number of units were
started in 1955 (though in none of the intervening years). In terms
of construction expenditures in current prices, the 1950 volume was
clearly exceeded in both 1954 and 1955, but in this series a delayed310 POSTSCRIPT:RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
TABLE 76





Current Prices 1929 Prices
(millions of dollars)
1950 1,352 11,525 5,346
1951 1,020 9,849 4,245
1952 1,069 9,870 4,144
1953 1,069 10,555 4,344
1954 1,202 12,070 5,017
1955 1,308 14,990 6,059
a Privatepermanent nonfarm housekeeping dwelling units.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics and Department of Commerce data.
peak was also found in earlier cycles. More relevant is the fact that
expenditures in 1929 prices were higher in 1955 than in 1950.
A case can be made from these data for extending the 1925-1950
cycle to 1955, and for considering the latter year as a "tentative
terminal peak." But the case is by no means clear-cut, and a more
nearly final verdict will be rendered oniy by the future behavior of
residential construction. If there should be a substantial and prolonged
decline during the next few years terminating, say, in the early sixties,
the 1955 volume may indeed be considered the terminal peak of a
1925-1955 cycle. If dwelling unit starts and construction expenditures
from 1956 to the early sixties should be fairly stable at the 1955 level or
somewhat below, and increase thereafter, the period after 1950 may
be more appropriately designated as a new cycle. This new cycle
would be characterized by something like a plateau formation from
peak to trough, that is, a decline in the rate of growth rather than in
absolute volume, and an absolute increase thereafter. Under such
conditions, the inclusion of 1951-1955 would add much of the first
phase of a new cycle to the last of the three swings analyzed in this
volume.
Regardless of the future course of residential construction, the lapse
of four years between the potential peaks of 1950 and 1955 warrants
caution in extending the 1925-1950 cycle used in the basic analysis.
In the interval between 1950 and 1955, both the number of dwelling
units started and construction expenditures in 1929 prices fell by as
much as 20 per cent. Some of this decline can be attributed to the
effects of the Korean hostilities. Without these, an unequivocal peak
might have been reached in 1951 or 1952. On this reasoning, the
1 While the three residential construction cycles from 1890 to 1950 were charac-
terized by pronounced absolute falls and rises, cycle phases marked off by changes
in the rate of growth are, of course, common.POSTSCRIPT: 1IECENT DEVELOPMENTS 311
terminal 1950 date would come closer to what would have happened
had there been no Korean war.
Under the circumstances, it seems best to analyze the bearing of
the 1951-1955 period on long-term growth trends in two ways: (1) by
determining its position, and that of the full postwar decade 1946-1955,
in the framework of the historical five-year and decade averages used
in Chapters III and IV, and (2) by extending the 1925-1950 cycle
to 1955, on the possibility that future events will call for such an
extension.
The Record of Ten Postwar Years
The annual average number of dwelling units started in the ten
postwar years 1946-1955 was 1,043,000, or 49 per cent more than the
annual average of 700,000 dwelling units for the twenties, the previous
peak decade. The five-year average for 1951-1955 was 1,134,000, or
30 per cent higher than that of the largest five-year volume of the
twenties (872,000 in 1923-1927). Similar comparisons are shown in
Table 77 for various measures of capital formation presented in
Chapters III and IV. In current prices, of course, all of these measures
show very large gains in recent postwar periods over comparable
periods in the twenties. In 1929 prices, however, the gains are modest,
ranging roughly from 2 to 15 per cent. When construction expendi-
tures for 1951-1955 are compared with those for the highest five-year
period of the twenties, no gain is apparent. When net capital forma-
tion is compared for the same periods, the recent volume was below
the best record of the twenties.
TABLE 77
Selected Ten- and Five-Year Annual Averages for Various Measures of
Capital Formation in Residential Real Estate
(millions of dollars)
















Construction expenditures, 1929 prices 3,7254,127 4,800 4,762
Gross capital formation, current prices









Net capital formation, current prices









a Thesources for the data 1946 to 1955, and the methods used for computing
them, are the same as those indicated in Chapters III and IV and in the appropriate
appendix tables
bTheyears are those indicated in the appropriate sections of Chapters III
and IV.312 POSTSCRIPT: RECENTDEVELOPMENTS
The comparison can be extended to the ratios discussed in Chapter
IV, which measure the growth of residential capital. Residential con-
struction expenditures in 1929 prices from 1950 to 1955, as a ratio of
1950 structure values in 1929 prices, averaged 5.72 per cent per year.
This average was below the 6.73 per cent of the twenties and the
8.02 per cent of the decade 1890-1899, but substantially above all other
decades included in the series (Table 14). The ratio of gross capital
formation to structure values, computed in the same fashion, was 6.25
per cent per annum and held a similar position in this series (Table
14). In other words, the ratio of new construction to the housing
stock, in constant prices, still shows evidence of a secular decline,
but the decline is less marked and less consistent than in the original
data.
Extending Table 15, one finds that the ratio of new dwelling units
started in 1950-1955 to the stock of dwelling units in 1950 averaged
2.95 per cent per year, still below the averages for the twenties and
for both the 1890-1899 and the 1900-1909 decades. Here, the evidence
of secular decline is somewhat modified but remains strong.
The annual increments to residential capital in 1929 prices (Table
20) from the end of 1949 to the end of 1955 averaged 3.82 per cent
of the value of residential structures at year-end 1949. This was sub-
stantially more than the average rate of growth in the two preceding
decades, but less than in the twenties and in the ten-year period
ending in 1899.
On the whole, to the extent that averages for ten years or even
shorter periods convey an impression of secular growth, the extended
data suggest declining rates of growth although the decline appears
less severe than in the original data. However, the absolute number
of dwelling units started during the postwar period has reached new
high levels, substantially exceeding previous records.
Extending the 1925-1950 Cycle to 1955
The modifications of the "cycle averages" caused by extending the
1925-1950 cycle to 1955 are summarized in Table 78 both for the
entire period and for the two subperiods used in the original analysis
in Chapters III and IV. For comparison with the preceding two cycles,
the reader must refer back to the original tables.
According to the modified data, the annual average number of starts
in the 1925-1955 cycle was almost one-third higher than in the pre-
ceding cycle of 1905-1925. But the increase was not as great as that
between the 1892-1905 and the 1905-1925 cycle, either absolutely
(129,000 dwelling units as against 183,000) or in relative terms (28POSTSCRIPT: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 313
TABLE 78
Annual Average Volume of Various Measures of Capital Formation














Dwelling units started (in thousands) 484 593' 581 780
Construction expenditures, current prices









Gross capital formation, current prices









Net capital formation, current prices




















Source: For the original data for 1925-1950 and 1941-1950, see Tables 2, 7, 12,
16, and 18. The sources of the additional data for 1951-1955, and the methods
used in computing them, are the same as those given for the original data. Terminal
years are weighted one-half. For some of the series, the initial year is 1926 rather
than 1925, as indicated in the original tables.
per cent as against 65 per cent). If the period 1941-1955 is considered
a separate cycle, however, the growth in dwelling unit starts is greater
in both absolute and relative terms. On this reckoning, one arrives at a
continuous increase in annual average starts from cycle to cycle,
interrupted only in the 1925-1941 period.
As one would expect, the rise from cycle to cycle in annual average
expenditures in current prices is merely accentuated by the new data.
Expenditures in 1929 prices for the extended cycles 1925-1955 and
1941-1955 also show an increase over the preceding cycle, in contrast
to the declines revealed in the original data. The increase between the
1905-1925 cycle and the 1925-1955 cycle is still smaller in absolute and
relative terms than the growth from the first to the second cycle. If the
1925-1955 period is divided into two cycles, however, the absolute
increase 1941-1955 over 1905-1925 was larger than that between 1892-
1905 and 1905-1925. The relative increase was about the same.
About the same relationships hold for the data on gross capital
formation in 1929 prices. However, annual average net capital forma-
tion in real terms during the 1925-1955 period was still about 10 per
cent lower than in 1905-1925. Here, the decline is diminished but not
erased by the addition of five years of record construction activity to
the last cycle. If the period 1941-1955 is considered a separate cycle,314 POSTSCRIPT: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
its annual average net capital formation shows an increase of almost
17 per cent over 1905-1925.
The annual average ratios of net capital formation to gross capital
formation are substantially raised when the last cycle is extended to
1955. Nevertheless, they still show a decline from the previous cycle
averages if reckoned in 1929 prices, although the declines are less
severe than in the original data.
The finding of an increasing amplitude of long swings would also be
modified if the 1925-1950 cycle were extended to 1955 (Table 79).
TABLE 79
Amplitude of Alternative Long Cycles for Various Measures of
Capital Formation in Residential Real Estate
TOTAL RISE RISE AND FALL
AND FALL PER YEAR
1925- 1941- 1925- 1941-
1955 1955 1955 1955
Dwelling units started 347.7%212.0% 11.6% 15.1%
Construction expenditures, current prices





Gross capital formation, current prices





Net capital formation, current prices





While the modifications vary in detail, depending upon the measure
of capital formation and the use of total or per-year rise and fall as a
measure of cycle amplitude, the impression of a flattening in cycle
amplitude prevails if the rise and fall per year is considered the more
valid test; and this impression is strengthened if the 1941-1955 period
is considered a separate cycle.
The reduction in total amplitude results from the high and rela-
tively stable level of residential construction in the post-1950 period.
The reduction, in the rise and fall per year is due to the same factor
plus the greater length of time over which the amplitude is averaged.
Thus the extension of the 1925-1950 cycle to 1955 on the whole
still yields a declining rate of growth as measured by cycle averages,
but the decline is less marked than the original data suggested.. If the
1925-1955 period is divided into two cycles, the results are more
ambiguous. The cycle amplitude in 1925-1955, which was measured as
a by-product rather than as an essential analytic ingredient of the
study, was less than in the preceding cycle. However, it must be said
again that the case for extending the long swing 1925-1950 to 1955 is
by no means a clear-cut one at present.POSTSCRIPT: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 315
Underlying Forces
This study reaffirmed the strong nexus between the long-term
growth of nonf arm households and the long-term growth of the
nonfarm housing stock in terms of dwelling units. It emphasized,
however, that this nexus does not necessarily require a close numerical
relationship between household growth and the number of new dwell-
ing units built. Between 1930 and 1950, conversions represented an
unusually large percentage of total dwelling units added to the supply,
with the result that the pre-1930 nexus between household growth and
new construction was broken. The data for 1950-1955 suggest that the
nexus was re-established and confirm the study's expectation that
conversions are likely to diminish in importance.
According to the estimates of the Bureau of the Census, the number
of nonfarm households between April 1950 and April 1955 increased
by 5,154,000. The number of nonfarm dwelling units started from
January 1950 through December 1954 totaled 5,712,000. This relation-
ship is very similar to the one existing in the 1890-1910 and 1910-1930
periods and is in sharp contrast to that of 1930-1950 (Table 25).
The ratio of new dwelling units started to the increase in nonfarm
population from 1950 to 1955 also shows a return to the pre-1930
pattern (Table 24, column 8). When the 5.7 million new dwelling
units started from 1950 through 1954 are related to the 13.7 million
increase in nonfarm population from April 1950 to April 1955, one
finds that a little over 416 new dwelling units were added per 1,000
increase in population. This ratio was higher than in any previous
decade (although only 38 units per 1,000 population more than in
1920-1930). If continued, it would signify the resumption of the his-
torical rise in this ratio between 1900 and 1930. The rise was in part
attributable to the long-term decline in the average size of nonf arm
households. This decline continued in the 1950-1955 period. The
average population per nonfarm household in April 1955 was 3.35 as
against 3.44 in April 1950 (Table 23).
One of the strategic factors in the declining rate of growth of resi-
dential capital in real terms was found to be the long-term fall in real
expenditure per new dwelling unit, from about $6,000 during the first
of the six decades under study to about $3,800 during the period 1946-
1953 (in 1929 prices; see Chapter VII and Table J-1). In recent
years, expenditures per new unit in 1929 prices have increased,
from $4,064 in 1953 to $4,174 in 1954 and more sharply to $4,622 in
1955. During the postwar period 1946-1955, the real value per new
unit rose 45 per cent, at about the same rate as during the decade of
the twenties. However, the evidence of a long-term decline in real316 POSTSCRIPT: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
expenditures per new dwelling unit remains strong. The average for
1951-1955 was still 28 per cent lower than that for 1925-1929, the
previous period in which peak values in this series were clustered.
For the original comparison between 1925-1929 and 1946-1953, the
decline was 35 per cent. This slowing down of the rate of decline is
consistent with the assumption made in the discussion of prospects for
real capital formation in this field (page 281).
The fall in real value per dwelling unit through 1953 explains at
least in part why construction expenditures, gross capital formation,
and net capital formation in real terms still show declining rates of
growth, even after the 1951-1955 data have been fully taken into
account, as shown in preceding sections of this chapter.
Recent changes in the numerous factors influencing real value per
new dwelling unit need only be sketched briefly. The increase in the
percentage of sing]e-family houses in total housing starts, observed
since the thirties, has continued. In 1954 and 1955, about 90 per cent of
all starts were in this category as against a range of 85 to 88 per cent
in 1950-1953. The share of the Pacific and Mountain states in total
housing starts his continued to rise. In 1954 and 1955, these states
accounted for over one-fourth of all nonfarm dwelling units started
as against 22.5 per cent in 1940-1950. In 1955, there were almost as
many homes built in California alone as in the nine states comprising
the New England and Middle Atlantic regions. On the other hand,
the shares of the West South Central and South Atlantic states, which
had shown an increase from 1920 to 1950, have declined in recent
years. The former area accounted for only 8.5 per cent of all starts in
1955 as against 12.2 per cent in 1940-1950. The latter accounted for
about 14 per cent as against 17.5 per cent in 1940-1950.
According to fragmentary evidence, new single-family houses built
in the past few years were somewhat larger than those offered in the
immediate postwar period, and they incorporated more equipment
and additional installations. Both these developments are consistent
with assumptions made in the discussion of future prospects.
Fragmentary evidence points also toward an increasing rate of
demolitions, which raises the demand for replacement units. Accord-
ing to estimates of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, based on surveys in
six cities, "it is possible that in the neighborhood of 250,000 to 300,000
nonf arm dwelling units have been withdrawn from the housing supply
annually in recent years."2 These withdrawals include "reverse con-
versions" as well as demolitions. If the estimates are confirmed by
2 Construction Review (U.S. Departments of Labor and Commerce), July 1955,
p. 8.POSTSCRIPT: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 317
more comprehensive surveys, annual withdrawals would be at a level
at least three or four times as high as those estimated for prewar years.
An increasing number of demolitions due to highway and urban
redevelopment programs and to stricter enforcement of local codes
was included among the factors favoring a high level of demand for
new dwelling units in the period to 1975 (Chapter XVII).
The Relative Position of Housing
Gross residential capital formation as a percentage of various
measures of aggregate economic activity has shown a long-term
decline (Chapter IX). In 1950, when construction was at a very high
level, the share of residential capital formation in the gross national
product (Department of Commerce definition) was 4.2 per cent in
current prices and 2.2 per cent in 1929 prices; in both cases these
ratios were far below those of 1922-1928. The ratios declined through
1952 and remained fairly stable in 1953 (Table K-3), but they in-
creased in 1954 and 1955 to about the level of 1950. The share of
residential capital formation in gross private capital formation (Com-
merce definition) in 1954 and 1955 exceeded that of 1950 in both
current and constant prices.
The movement of these ratios has always been subject to con-
siderable fluctuations superimposed on a long-run downward trend.
The data for 1954 and 1955 may well denote such short-term fluctua-
tion. The factors that have produced the long-run decline of resi-
dential capital formation in the nation's output—the stimulation of
new wants and services and the introduction of new products—have
not lost their force. It would be rash, therefore, to interpret the chang-
ing relative position of residential capital formation in total output or
total capital formation in 1954 and 1955 as a reversal of a long-run
trend.
It is likewise too early to determine whether certain phenomena
observed in the long postwar period of sustained prosperity and
growth signify a basic change in consumer preferences for housing
(Chapter VIII). The possibility of a change in favor of housing and
the forces that might cause such a change were discussed in Chapter
XVII: the growth of home ownership, the increase in leisure, the
cultural influences of progressive suburbanization, larger families, and
the apparently greater focus on family and home in our daily lives.
But a good case can also be made for interpreting the sustained high
level of housing demand to date as reflecting the usually long-delayed
effects of continued increases in real income, rather than as a manifesta-
tion of an autonomous change in consumers' taste. We may well be on
the threshold of such a change. More evidence, however, will be318 POSTSCRIPT: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
required before such an interpretation can be placed on recent
developments.
No such evidence is as yet to be found, for example, in the amount
of real residential capital per capita. In 1955 this amount stood at $740
in 1929 prices, only slightly above the $703 for 1950 and quite low in
comparison with previous decennial figures (Table 36) considering
the rise in per capita real income.
The Growth of Residential Mortgage Debt
The postwar increase of the residential mortgage debt has con-
tinued at a spectacular pace. The total reached a probable $102 billion
at the end of 1955, as against less than $55 billion in 1950 (Chapter
XI, Table 40). On this basis, the per capita debt in 1955 stood at $722
as compared with $426 in 1950, and the debt per nonfarm household
was $2,417 as against $1,480. The residential mortgage debt in relation
to disposable personal income increased from less than 27 per cent
in 1950 and less than 30 per cent in 1952 (Table 42) to a postwar peak
of almost 40 per cent in 1955. This ratio comes close to the all-time
decennial high of 41 per cent in 1930 and is nearly 25 times the
1945 ratio.
The reader must again be reminded that these data cannot measure
"the burden of the debt," nor do they give any hint as to the limits
•of "sound" debt expansion. Most of the postwar increase in residential
mortgage indebtedness is attributable to borrowing by home owners
and is therefore intimately related to the spectacular growth of home
ownership in recent years. The percentage of nonfarm dwelling units
occupied by the owner increased from 41 in 1940 to 53 in 1950 and
again to 57 in 1955. The number of home owners in 1955 was about
24 million as against less than 20 million in 1950 and 11.4 million in
1940. As more consumers occupy single-family homes which they
buy, rather than dwelling units which they may rent, they are assum-
ing a burden in the form of debt; otherwise, they would have assumed
a burden in the form of outlays for rent.
The increasing importance of the home mortgage debt in total
consumer outlays for housing raises important questions. Among them
This estimate is based on the preliminary totals of $89.1 billion for the debt
on one- to four-family nonfarm homes and $32.6 billion for the debt on multi-
family and commercial properties (President's Economic Report, January 1956,
p. 212). The $102 billion for the residential debt assumes that 40 per cent of the
debt on multi-family and commercial properties was secured by multi-family
residences, as against 43 per cent in 1950. A decline in this percentage seemed
warranted in view of the small volume of multi-family residential construction and
the large volume of commercial construction between 1950 and 1955.'
President's Economic Report, Chart 31 and p. 80.POSTSCRIPT: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 319
are the relative flexibility of debt payments and rents in the case of
declines in family income; the possibility that families usually improve
their housing standards when they purchase homes and so increase
their outlay for housing; the changes in the relative costs of owning
and renting that have resulted from liberal credit terms and operating
economies in single-family houses for which the owner serves as janitor
and repairman; and the effects of these changed cost relationships on
the vulnerability of homeowners to foreclosure. But these matters
cannot be pursued here.
In 1954 and 1955 the pace of net mortgage borrowings outstripped
the pace of real capital formation, accentuating the trend in this direc-
tion. The residential mortgage debt increased by $24 billion while net
residential capital formation totaled $18.5 billion. The ratio of mortgage
debt increments to residential construction expenditures averaged
81.5 per cent, appreciably above the 1948-1952 average of 67 per cent
(Table 45). The ratio of debt to residential wealth also rose sharply,
from 25.7 per cent in 1952 to a new high of 32.8 per cent in 1955—
exceeding the ratio of the twenties and even the average ratio of the
early thirties, when falling real estate values combined with the debt
inherited from the twenties caused the ratio to reach its prewar peak.
The share of the residential mortgage debt in total private long-term
debt has continued to increase. The residential mortgage debt at the
end of 1955 accounted for nearly one half (48.5 per cent) of the total
private long-term debt, as against 43.3 per cent in 1950 and 45.5
per cent in 1952. The, residential mortgage was still growing in im-
portance as an outlet for investment of capital funds. Institutional
investment in residential mortgages has maintained both its absolute
and relative growth. At the end of 1954 the mortgage loans held by
the four major institutional lenders (savings banks, savings and loan
associations, life insurance companies, and commercial banks) equaled
84 per cent of the total residential mortgage debt as compared with
80 per cent in 1950 (Chapter XIII).
As to the flow of funds into new residential construction, the tend-
ency toward an increasing proportion of borrowed funds has probably
been accentuated in the past few years. According to the estimates in
Table 80 and Appendix Table M-1, the proportion of equity funds
used in the acquisition of new residential real estate declined from
29 per cent in 1951-1953 to 27 per cent in 1954 and 23 per cent in 1955.
If any confidence can be placed in the figures and assumptions under-
lying these calculations, they confirm the two main conclusions pre-
See Louis Winnick, "The Burden of the Residential Mortgage Debt," Journal
of Finance, March 1956.320 POSTSCRIPT:BECENT DEVELOPMENTS
TABLE 80
Estimates of the Flow of Mortgage Loans and Equity Funds
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Amount of mortgage loans
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' Basedon FRA data on average price of site as percentage
bAslight decline in this ratio has been assumed in the absence of data.
CTheloan-to-value ratio for FHA-insured home loans averaged 82 to 83 per
cent. The step-up in the ratio from 1953 to 1955 is based primarily on the increase
in the percentage of VA-guaranteed loans on new homes without downpayment.
This percentage increased steadily from 17.2 in January 1954 to 58.6 in April 1955
and remained over 50 through November 1955.
Source: See Appendix M for the methods used in these estimates.
of total value.
viously drawn from the analysis of the flow of equity and borrowed
funds into new residential construction:(1) a tendency for the
proportion of borrowed funds to increase in periods of expanding
construction volume, and (2) a long-run tendency for this proportion
to rise, which is superimposed on the Cyclical variations in the use
of borrowings.
The Role of Federal Aids
The federal government's role in private residential construction
and its financing, as measured by the share of the FHA and veterans'
home loan programs in housing starts and home mortgage lending, has
increased during the past few years. The new dwelling units financed
by FHA-insured and VA-guaranteed loans, which in 1952 and 1953
accounted for 39 per cent of all new private units started (Table 37),
represented 48 per cent of the total in 1954 and 51 per cent in 1955,
which equaled the previous peak ratio of 1950. While the share of thePOSTSCRIPT: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 321
FHA program in private housing starts declined, that of the veterans'
home loan program rose sharply. In 1955 three of every ten housing
units started were financed with veterans' home loans.
The amount of outstanding government-underwritten home mort-
gage loans increased from $28 billion atthe end of 1953 to an estimated
$39 billion at the end of 1955. The share of such loans in the total
home mortgage debt remained roughly 42 to 43 per cent. That this
share did not increase in line with the sharp advance in housing starts
under the government programs was due, among other things, to the
fact that government-underwritten loans are used much less in the
financing of purchase of older houses.
Thus, while govenmenta1 policies of recent years, as pointed out in
Chapter XVI, have redefined the role of the Federal National Mort-
gage Association in the secondary mortgage market and have made
some progress in adapting mortgage lending terms under government
programs to the objectives of economic stabilization, the over-all
quantitative influence of these programs upon capital formation and
financing in residential real estate has by no means diminished.
Implications for Future Prospects
In summary, this re-examination of long-term trends in the light
of recent developments suggests modifications of some of the study's
major findings in detail or in degree but not in substance. In other
cases, it confirms and strengthens the original conclusions.
Both the new five-year and ten-year averages for the postwar period,
and the extension of the last cycle to include the years 1925 to 1955,
indicate a slower decline in the rate of growth than shown by the
original data. Most of the measures of capital formation in real terms
still point to a declining growth rate. The number of dwelling units
built shows some growth from the second to the third cycle, and
from the previous peaks of the twenties to the recent postwar peaks,
in contrast to a level movement or decline revealed by the original
data. However, it has already been pointed out in Chapter XVII that
"the failure of dwelling unit starts during the 1925-1950 cycle to
increase over the previous cycle cannot be interpreted as a secular
trend and mechanically projected into the future."
The contrast between the original and the mddified findings is the
strongest when the 1925-1955 period is considered to comprise two
cycles divided by the year 1941. But the new averages for this period,
it must be emphasized again, rest on a cycle definition that cannot
be fully supported on present evidence.
Some of the recent developments, such as the increases in the real
value per new dwelling unit and in the share of residential construction322 POSTSCRIPT: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
in total output, are of such short duration that their significance for
long-run trends cannot be appraised. Just as the decade of the twenties
presented sharp deviations from secular trends observed over a sixty-
year period, it is possible that some of the developments in the recent
postwar decade will emerge as fluctuations superimposed on trend
lines.
While variations in the rate of growth are important to certain kinds
of economic analysis, consideration of absolute magnitudes is equally
significant for an appraisal of future prospects. As was pointed out
in Chapter XVII, "the number of additional households between 1950
and 1975 is likely to exceed any increment on record." The estimates
derived from the recently revised projections of the Bureau of the
Census to the year 1975, already used in Chapter XVII, give added
support to this expectation. The new data brought together in this
postscript, quite apart from their possible bearing upon modifications
of past growth trends, serve also to identify more clearly some of the
elements of strength in future capital formation, already sketched in
Chapter XVII. Thus demolitions, for the first time in many decades
if not in the history of residential real estate in this country, seem to
reach proportions calling for a large volume of new construction over
and above the long-term rate of net household formation. The forces
supporting the high level of demolitions are probably of more than
temporary character. If withdrawals from the housing supply of 300,000
dwelling units per year are added to an annual average net nonfarm
household formation in the neighborhood of 1,000,000, close to the
median estimate derived from the projections of the Bureau of the
Census, the average number of new dwelling units that would equal
these two potential sources of demand by far exceeds any historical
record for a similar period. In combination with a decelerated decline
in the real value per new dwelling unit, as akeady outlined in Chap-
ter XVII, such a level of housing starts on the average would yield
total real expenditures for housing construction greater than those
recorded for any previous period of twenty years.
Such a development, among other things, would have important
implications for the demand for funds, even if further increases in
construction costs and house prices were ignored. Not only would
mortgage investment remain a large outlet for funds, but there may
be a question as to whether the supply of savings will be adequate to
meet the demand for financing a high average volume of housing
construction as well as the demand for long-term funds in other sectors
of the economy, without an appreciable increase in interest rates.
Because the demand for housing is particularly sensitive to credit
terms and depends heavily on debt financing, a general long-term in-POSTSCRIPT: BECENT DEVELOPMENTS 323
creasein the cost of borrowing would tend to affect the volume of
residential construction more than the volume of business investment,
a large portion of which is financed from internal funds. Thus it is
possible that the ease of borrowing for housing construction and home
purchase, which by and large prevailed during the past twenty years
and tended to raise the level of demand, will be replaced by greater
stringency. Such a turn of events, among other things, would intensify
the search for new sources of mortgage funds and add to the problems
of government policies affecting this sector of the economy.
NOTE: Unless otherwise indicated, the data for this postscript are taken from
the standard sources used throughout the volume. In the interest of simplicity,
specific references have been omitted. In a few cases the data mentioned in the
postscript for the early years of this decade are slight revisions of preliminary
figures given earlier in the volume.